Explaining Laws in Special Relativity :: Science Mathematics Papers

Explaining Laws in Special RelativityWesley Salmon has suggested that the two leading bets of scientific explanation, the bottom-up view and the top-down view, describe distinct types of explanation. In this paper, I focus on theoretical explanations in physics, i.e., explanations of sensible laws. Using explanations of E=mc2, I debate that the distinction between bottom-up explanations (BUEs) and top-down explanations (BUEs) is dress hat understood as a manifestation of a deeper distinction, found originally in Newtons work, between two levels of theory. I use Einsteins distinction between principle and constructive theories to argue that only lower level theories, i.e., constructive theories, can yield BUEs. These explanations, furthermore, numerate on higher level laws that beget only TDEs from a principle theory. Thus, I conclude that Salmons challenge to characterize the blood between the two types of explanation can be met only by recognizing the close relationsh ip between types of theoretical explanation and the structure of carnal theory. The two leading views of scientific explanation, Salmons bottom-up view and the Friedman-Kitcher top-down view, give what appear to be prima facie incompatible characterizations of scientific explanation. According to the bottom-up view, we formulate a given phenomenon when we uncover the primal causal mechanisms that are responsible for its occurrence. The top-down view, on the other hand, maintains that we explain a phenomenon by deriving it from the general principles or laws that best commix our knowledge. In this paper, I focus on theoretical explanations in physics, i.e., explanations of physical laws. I first show that, as Salmon suggests (1989, p. 180-182), it seems promising to direct these two approaches not so much as different views or so explanation but rather as descriptions of two distinct types of scientific explanations on that point are clear cases of laws that have bottom-up explanations (BUEs) while others receive only top-down explanations (TDEs). I then argue, using explanations of mass-energy equivalence in Special Relativity (SR), that this disparity (why should some laws receive only TDEs after(prenominal) all?) is best understood as a symptom of a deeper distinction, first introduced by Newton, between two levels of physical theory. At wiz level, there is the collection of general principles and definitions of physical terms, i.e., a theoretical framework, from which adept derives general constraints for all physical processes. At a lower level, there are laws that identify and describe specific physical interactions like gravity and electromagnetism.